In its early days, the AI initiative known as Project Maven had its fair share of skeptics at the Pentagon. Today, many of them are true believers. The rise of AI warfare speaks to the biggest moral and practical question there is: Who--or what--gets to decide to take a human life? And who bears that cost? In 2018, more than 3,000 Google workers protested the company's involvement in "the business of war" after finding out the company was part of Project Maven, then a nascent Pentagon effort to use computer vision to rifle through copious video footage taken in America's overseas drone wars. They feared Project Maven's AI could one day be used for lethal targeting. In my yearslong effort to uncover the full story of Project Maven for my book,, I learned that is exactly what happened, and that the undertaking was just as controversial inside the Pentagon. Today, the tool known as Maven Smart System is being used in US operations against Iran . How the US military's top brass moved from skepticism about the use of AI in war to true believers has a lot to do with a Marine colonel named Drew Cukor. In early September 2024, during the cocktail hour at a private retreat for tech investors and defense leaders, Vice Admiral Frank "Trey" Whitworth found his way to Drew Cukor. Now Project Maven's founding leader and his skeptical successor were standing face-to-face. Three years earlier, Whitworth had been the Pentagon's top military official for intelligence, advising the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and running one of the most sensitive and potentially lethal parts of any military process: targeting.

An engineer at the AgiBot factory in Shanghai, China, where the 5,000th mass-produced humanoid robot had rolled off the production line. An engineer at the AgiBot factory in Shanghai, China, where the 5,000th mass-produced humanoid robot had rolled off the production line. How close are we to the sci-fi vision of autonomous humanoid robots? C hen Liang, the founder of Guchi Robotics, an automation company headquartered in Shanghai, is a tall, heavy-set man in his mid-40s with square-rimmed glasses. His everyday manner is calm and understated, but when he is in his element - up close with the technology he builds, or in business meetings discussing the imminent replacement of human workers by robots - he wears an exuberant smile that brings to mind an intern on his first day at his dream job. Guchi makes the machines that install wheels, dashboards and windows for many of the top Chinese car brands, including BYD and Nio. He took the name from the Chinese word, "steadfast intelligence", though the fact that it sounded like an Italian luxury brand was not entirely unwelcome. For the better part of two decades, Chen has tried to solve what, to him, is an engineering problem: how to eliminate - or, in his view, liberate - as many workers in car factories as technologically possible. Late last year, I visited him at Guchi headquarters on the western outskirts of Shanghai. Next to the head office are several warehouses where Guchi's engineers tinker with robots to fit the specifications of their customers. Chen, an engineer by training, founded Guchi in 2019 with the aim of tackling the hardest automation task in the car factory: "final assembly", the last leg of production, when all the composite pieces - the dashboard, windows, wheels and seat cushions - come together. At present, his robots can mount wheels, dashboards and windows on to a car without any human intervention, but 80% of the final assembly, he estimates, has yet to be automated. That is what Chen has set his sights on. As in much of the world, AI has become part of everyday life in China . But what most excites Chinese politicians and industrialists are the strides being made in the field of robotics, which, when combined with advances in AI, could revolutionise the world of work.

We can't let them hide behind their models From Gaza to Iran, the pattern is the same: precision weapons, chosen blindness, and dead children. There is an Israeli military strategy called the "fog procedure". First used during the second intifada, it's an unofficial rule that requires soldiers guarding military posts in conditions of low visibility to shoot bursts of gunfire into the darkness, on the theory that an invisible threat might be lurking. It's violence licensed by blindness. Shoot into the darkness and call it deterrence. With the dawn of AI warfare, that same logic of chosen blindness has been refined, systematized, and handed off to a machine.

Our study of 22 mitigation techniques and five baselines reveals up to 12.6% fairness variance across identical training runs with identical seeds.

Computing an approximately optimal policy with high probability in this case is known as PAC RL with a generative model.

Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

See Corollary 2 in Appendixfordetail.

Influence functions estimate the effect of removing a training point on a model without theneedtoretrain. Theyarebasedonafirst-order Taylorapproximation thatisguaranteed tobeaccurate forsufficiently small changes tothemodel, and so are commonly used to study the effect of individual points in large datasets. However, we often want to study the effects of largegroups of training points, e.g., todiagnose batch effects orapportion credit between different data sources.

'I wish I could push ChatGPT off a cliff': professors scramble to save critical thinking in an age of AI Lea Pao, a professor of literature at Stanford University, has been experimenting with ways to get her students to learn offline. She has them memorize poems, perform at recitation events, look at art in the real world. It's an effort to reconnect them to the bodily experience of learning, she said, and to keep them from turning to artificial intelligence to do the work for them. "There's no AI-proof anything," Pao said. "Rather than policing it, I hope that their overall experiences in this class will show them that there's a way out."

Graph neural networks (GNNs) work remarkably well in semi-supervised node regression, yet a rigorous theory explaining when and why they succeed remains lacking. To address this gap, we study an aggregate-and-readout model that encompasses several common message passing architectures: node features are first propagated over the graph then mapped to responses via a nonlinear function. For least-squares estimation over GNNs with linear graph convolutions and a deep ReLU readout, we prove a sharp non-asymptotic risk bound that separates approximation, stochastic, and optimization errors. The bound makes explicit how performance scales with the fraction of labeled nodes and graph-induced dependence. Approximation guarantees are further derived for graph-smoothing followed by smooth nonlinear readouts, yielding convergence rates that recover classical nonparametric behavior under full supervision while characterizing performance when labels are scarce. Numerical experiments validate our theory, providing a systematic framework for understanding GNN performance and limitations.